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Abstract
We provide evidence that changes in the equity price and volatility of individual ¯rms (mea-
sures that approximate the de¯nition of 'granular shock' given in Gabaix, 2010) are key to
improve the predictability of aggregate business cycle °uctuations in a number of countries.
Speci¯cally, adding the return and the volatility of ¯rm-level equity prices to aggregate ¯nancial
information leads to a signi¯cant improvement in forecasting business cycle developments in four
economic areas, at various horizons. Importantly, not only domestic ¯rms but also foreign ¯rms
improve business cycle predictability for a given economic area. This is not immediately visible
when one takes an unconditional standpoint (i.e. an average across the sample). However, con-
ditioning on the business cycle position of the domestic economy, the relative importance of the
two sets of ¯rms - foreign and domestic - exhibits noticeable swings across time. Analogously, the
sectoral classi¯cation of the ¯rms that in a given month retain the highest predictive power for
future IP changes also varies signi¯cantly over time as a function of the business cycle position
of the domestic economy. Limited to the United States, predictive ability is found to be related
to selected balance sheet items, suggesting that structural features di®erentiate the ¯rms that
can anticipate aggregate °uctuations from those that do not help to this aim. Beyond the purely
forecasting application, this ¯nding may enhance our understanding of the underlying origins of
aggregate °uctuations. We also propose to use the cross sectional stock market information to
macro-prudential aims through an economic Value at Risk.
JEL Classi¯cation: C53; C58; F37; G15
Keywords: Business cycle forecasting; granular shock; international linkages.5
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Non-technical summary 
Real developments, as measured for example by changes in GDP or Industrial 
Production (IP) Indices over selected horizons, are typically forecast through a 
combination of macroeconomic variables, financial variables and confidence 
indicators.
These three sets of variables have been so far typically selected at the aggregate level, 
i.e. no firm-level information has been regularly employed to forecast business cycle 
developments. The reason for this is that firm-level shocks should wash out with each 
other in the aggregate and therefore they should not affect the overall economy. 
However, it has been recently shown (Gabaix, 2010) that the cross sectional 
distribution of firms’ size matters a lot for the validity of this assumption. If the 
distribution of firms’ size has fat tails, then firm-level shocks may propagate to the 
overall economy. Gabaix indeed showed that the idiosyncratic shocks to the rate of 
growth in the sales of the largest US firms can predict the one-quarter-ahead growth 
rate of the US GDP. 
In this paper we analyse in more detail the implications of Gabaix’s theory, taking as 
well an international perspective that looks at four economic areas. However, we do 
not restrict ourselves to considering big firms. Rather, we analyse the predictive 
power stemming from a large cross section of firms’equity prices with the key finding 
that, in a given month, it is only a small subset of these firms that help improve 
predictability. Overall, the composition of the set of most predictive firms remains 
stable for around half a year. It is only after this identification has been made that we 
investigate which are the firms’ characteristics that are associated with an high 
predictive power for subsequent changes in the IP indices. 
Among other results we show that i) idiosyncratic shocks to firm-level equity returns 
and variances can noticeably improve the prediction of the growth rate in the IP 
indices especially at horizons between 12 and 24 months; ii) for a given economic 
area, domestic firms and foreign firms are equally important to improve the forecast 
and their relative ability to do so changes a lot across the cycle; iii) among the features 6
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which make firms helpful in anticipating real growth, size does not seem to be a key 
factor. Rather the sector in which firms operate as well as other balance sheet items 
related to the performance of the firms, their investments as well as their international 
activity seem to be more prominent. 
Taken together these findings can help shed more light of the key factors behind 
aggregate fluctuations. 7
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1 Introduction
The recent recession episode that started in the United States in December 2007 stood as another
challenge for our ability to anticipate the timing and the amplitude of business cycle ﬂuctuations.
Throughout 2007, almost all the forecasts computed by central banks, academics and market par-
ticipants were not able to detect the approaching sharp decline in real GDP, even when produced
around end-2008, right ahead of remarkably negative GDP growth ﬁgures. The highly coincident and
sharply negative GDP growth rates recorded almost worldwide through the recession, and especially
in 2008Q4 and 2009Q1, contribute to make the failure in forecasting even more serious and call, at
the very least, for a critical review of the mainstream forecasting methodologies. This paper aims to
make some steps in this direction.
So far, economic ﬂuctuations have been predicted almost exclusively through the aggregate infor-
mation conveyed either by i) macro variables (labor market conditions, money, credit, lagged growth),
ii) ﬁnancial indicators (aggregate stock market returns and variances, slope of the yield curve, credit
spreads) or iii) conﬁdence (households or business) indicators. Focusing on models including aggre-
gate ﬁnancial variables, which are also the focus of the present paper, a broad conclusion reached by
analyses carried out so far is that their predictive power is broadly unstable over time and also that
the set of indicators which are key to improve the forecast of business cycle developments tends to
change composition over time.
Fornari and Mele (2009) provide a detailed assessment of the out of sample forecasting ability of
univariate linear and non linear models which rely on ﬁnancial indicators. Overall, their conclusion is
that the term spread, together with a time-varying measure of stock market volatility, does a rather
good job in anticipating the rates of change in the US post-War industrial production index. However,
nearly all of the combinations of variables they look at have their moment of popularity, so that what
is eventually judged to be the best model is not the best model consistently across the sample. This
ﬁnding cannot but conﬁrm that recessions are intrinsically diﬀerent, both as concerns their roots and
the way in which the originating shock propagates across the economy.
But, if recessions are diﬀerent and shocks transmit both domestically and internationally in a
time varying fashion, should not we employ a broader set of regressors -and potentially models -to
better track this variability across time? For example, many recent approaches to forecasting consider
pooling the individual forecasts stemming from a large number of models, each diﬀering from the other
as concerns for example the lag speciﬁcation, the sample over which estimation is carried out, the
number of variables included. This has been the way in which the so-called uncertain instabilities have
been dealt with in weather forecasting, an approach which has recently spilled over to macroeconomic
and ﬁnancial forecasting (see Amisano and Geweke, 2009; Clark and McCracken, 2006; Jore et al.,
2008).
In this paper we come closer to this strategy as we test the hypothesis that a linear combination of
selected past idiosyncratic shocks recorded by the equity price of a given ﬁrm helps track and forecast
aggregate business cycle ﬂuctuations. At this stage we like to anticipate, however, that, somewhat
against the beneﬁt achieved by pooling many forecasts suggested by this strand of literature, our
conclusions are that pooling individual information does not typically represent a good alternative
to a situation in which instead a small number of regressors (i.e. a subset of the full information set
whose composition changes over time) are selected according to some real-time criterion of ﬁt. In
other words, the largest part of the improvement in predictive ability which is found inside the large
cross section of equity prices that we look at comes, at each point in time, from the idiosyncratic
equity price movement recorded by a handful of ﬁrms out the large number which composes the cross8
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Firm-level information did not receive big attention in macro forecasting so far (see, however,
Gilchrist et al., 2009, for an application in which ﬁrm-level credit spreads are used for business cycle
forecasting)1 primarily as the idiosyncratic ﬂuctuations of a given equity price should be irrelevant in
an aggregate economy characterised by a large number of ﬁrms. This assumption, however, heavily
depends on the empirical distribution of ﬁrms’ size having thin tails, i.e. ﬁnite variance. However, a fat
tailed distribution may be a better proxy of reality, consistently also with the industrial structure of
modern economies, in which the weight of large corporations and multinationals has been signiﬁcantly
on the rise over at least the last two decades. It is exactly under the latter conditions that Gabaix
(2010) derived his so-called granular explanation of aggregate ﬂuctuations.2 Basically, his empirical
evidence shows that the aggregated shock to the rate of growth of the sales made by the 100 largest
US ﬁrms anticipates the rate of growth of the US GDP over the subsequent quarter and has a power
which remains robust to the various controls that he applies. We anticipate, however, that we do not
ﬁnd size (as measured by sales in the empirical evidence in Gabaix) to be the key reason behind the
predictive power for aggregate ﬂuctuations that we ﬁnd in the equity price of speciﬁc ﬁrms. We also
show that the gain in the predictability of business cycle conditions that we ﬁnd in the cross section
of equity prices does not come randomly from any given ﬁrm. Rather, it is highly concentrated within
a limited subset of these ﬁrms whose size, as measured by more than one criterion, is however very
scattered. If any, a sector-related explanation has more empirical support than size. In this paper we
also consider the international dimension of the granularity hypothesis, i.e. whether the idiosyncratic
equity price movement of ﬁrms in a given country i matter to explain the aggregate ﬂuctuations in
another country, j, controlling for some 𝑗-related pieces of information. As for countries, we look at
the United States, the United Kingdom, Japan and a subset of the euro area represented by Germany,
France and Italy.
Before moving forward let us also point out that predictive power of ﬁrm speciﬁc shocks for
aggregate ﬂuctuations is also hinted in the news shocks - animal spirit shocks interpretation of the
innovations to consumer conﬁdence provided in Barsky and Sims (2010). They ﬁnd that shocks to
consumer conﬁdence, while orthogonal to current consumption and growth, give rise to persistent
increases in such variables over time. In other words, unexpected developments in conﬁdence seem
to be clean signals of future rises in productivity. We conjecture that a similar role could be played
by the shocks to individual (and aggregate) equity prices. For example, an unexpected decline in
the equity price of a ﬁrm could stem from the postponement of some of the ﬁrms’ projects -due for
example to lack of demand for its products or tight credit availability -which some market analysts
ﬁrst -and eventually the market as a whole -interprets as a bad signal about the future proﬁtability
of the ﬁrm. Of course, being ﬁrm-speciﬁc, this shock will be irrelevant for most of the remaining ﬁrms
as well as for the aggregate economy in the speciﬁc moment in which it is realized. Nonetheless, it
may be capturing the ﬁrst signs of of macroeconomic or ﬁnancial shocks that later on will eventually
spread through the whole economy. The fact that our regressions evidence that the predictability of
the changes in the industrial production indices peaks at longer horizons rather than at very short
ones would suggest that also shocks to equity price are almost orthogonal to current growth, while
anticipating future developments in business cycle conditions over more distant horizons.3
1This paper points out that not any corporate bond spread helps forecast business cycle developments. Rather the
forecasting power of corporate bonds with too high or too low rating is poorer than for bonds with a ’average’ rating.
2Similarly to what Gabaix proposes, Carvalho, 2009, shows that network eﬀects among sectors generate signiﬁcant
propagation eﬀects. There is also an established literature exploring the impact of microeconomic shocks on aggregate
ﬂuctuations, as Jovanovic, 1987; Durlauf, 1993; Horvath, 1998, 2000; Conley and Dupor, 2003.
3Always with reference to equity price shocks, Beaudry et al., (2010) analyze the international spillover of news9
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The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we describe the data and the econometric method-
ology. In section 3 we report some unconditional evidence of the relationships between real activity,
aggregate information and ﬁrm level variables, in the countries that we consider. This evidence is
intended to give a preliminary ﬂavour of the results presented in the remainder of the paper. Section
4 investigates the domestic and the international dimension of the granularity hypothesis through an
out of sample econometric exercise. Section 5 looks at the sector-wise composition of the predictive
distribution of the ﬁrms as well as -limited to the United States -it analyzes whether characteristics
of the ﬁrms, as captured by key balance sheet items, are related to their predictive power for business
cycle developments. Section 6 looks at some robustness issues while Section 7 evidences how the cross
sectional equity market information could be used from a macro-ﬁnancial stability perspective.
2 Methodology
The hypothesis that we want to test is whether real economic activity -proxied by industrial produc-
tion -can be better anticipated when one looks at ﬁrm level information 4 in addition to aggregate
information. Beyond lagged industrial production, our aggregate variables include the term spread
(𝑇𝑒𝑟𝑚) and the return and the variance of the stock market index (𝑀𝑘𝑡𝑅𝑒𝑡 and 𝑀𝑘𝑡𝑉𝑎𝑟). Admit-
tedly we do not consider too large a set of macroeconomic indicators and there are two main reasons
to do so. First of all, ﬁnancial variables have been typically found to quickly embody information
releases about a broad set of macroeconomic variables. In this respect, we expect ﬁnancial variables to
be good substitutes for macroeconomic information at the monthly frequency we adopt in the paper.
In addition, a large body of literature has evidenced that ﬁnancial variables do a good job in ﬁtting
and anticipate business cycle phases (Estrella, 2005). Second, as we take a real-time standpoint in
performing the predictive regressions, the diﬀerent release dates of macroeconomic variables should
be properly handled and would need to be examined within a setup similar to Aruoba et al. (2009),
leading to a much more complex framework than the simple linear regressions we employ.5 Although
Stock and Watson (2003) are frequently reported as evidence against the existence of predictive power
in ﬁnancial variables, we rely on them especially as the results in Espinoza et al. (2011) point to ﬁ-
nancial information i) being not useless when one takes an out of sample standpoint and ii) being
more important in improving the forecasts in periods characterized by ﬁnancial turbulence.
We forecast developments in the growth rate of the Industrial Production index in a given coun-
try/economic area over ℎ months through the following simple univariate regression:
shocks and conclude that a news shock in a large country can create national business cycles and international business
cycles, thereby providing motivation for our research, although in their analysis the spillover of the news shock is related
to a concept of geographical proximity.
4The ﬁrm level variables that we use are the return and the variance of selected equity prices (𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑖, 𝑉𝑎 𝑟 𝑖), which
match the aggregate information we look at.
5See also Giannone et al., 2008, for a related approach.10
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with size(f(h))=m and where ℎ, the forecast horizon, is equal to 6, 12, 18 or 24 months and
𝑓(ℎ)=( ℎ+6,ℎ+12,ℎ+18) represents the lag structure chosen for the regressors; 𝑖𝑝𝑡 is the Industrial
Production index, 𝑇𝑒𝑟𝑚and 𝑀𝑘𝑡𝑅𝑒𝑡and 𝑀𝑘𝑡𝑉𝑎𝑟are -respectively -the term spread and the return
and the variance of the overall stock market index. As said, 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑖 and 𝑉𝑎 𝑟 𝑖 are the return and the
variance of the equity price of selected ﬁrms. Given the overlapping nature of the data, regressions are
always corrected via a heteroskedasticity consistent Newey and West estimator based on a window of
data which is a function of ℎ. The choice for 𝑓(ℎ) made above is of course arbitrary in our regressions.
We tried diﬀerent combinations and always reached the conclusion that long lags are needed to
signiﬁcantly improve forecasts (see also, concerning this choice, the impulse responses of GDP to
uncertainty shocks in Bloom, 2009). As said, the inclusion of the term spread and the stock market
return and volatility in the regressors is motivated by the remarkable success of these variables reported
in the literature (see Estrella, 2005; Fornari and Mele, 2009). Overall, they convey information about
ﬁnancial risk, economic risk premiums and monetary policy. During expansions, market participants
exhibit increasing risk appetite and the the risk premiums for long term investments declines. For this
reason, and also because monetary policy is typically counter-cyclical, the term spread is expected to
be negatively correlated to the economic activity. Stock market volatility, on the other hand, conveys
information about the riskiness of ﬁnancial markets and, more generally, of the overall macroeconomic
environment. A riskier environment typically leads ﬁrms to under-invest and under-hire (Bloom, 2009),
ultimately aﬀecting economic activity, so that higher stock market volatility is expected to lead to
lower economic growth. Households are also typically found to postpone spending decisions at times
of heightened uncertainty. The aggregate stock market return is included in the regressions mainly
to ﬁlter out the part of a ﬁrm equity return that stems from its systematic co-movement with the
market. In fact, what we look at are the idiosyncratic movements of the ﬁrms’ returns and returns
volatilities, relative to the market index. Basically, rather than pre-ﬁltering ﬁrms’ returns with the
market return and ﬁrms’ variances with the market variance, and having therefore to deal with the
problems induced by generated regressors, we directly insert the aggregate market return and variance
in the above equation (more on this aspect is in the Robustness section). We insert in the regressions
information about one ﬁrm at a time, so to assess the signiﬁcance and extent of every marginal piece
of information added by individual ﬁrms. We carry out the analysis both at a purely domestic level,
i.e. considering how business cycles in the four economic areas we analyze are anticipated by the set
of domestic ﬁrms only, and at the international level, i.e. consider cross-country interactions. In this
way we can ascertain the extent in which global information dominates/is dominated by domestic
information. To anticipate, we ﬁnd that foreign ﬁrms can anticipate domestic real developments
but on average they can do no better than domestic ﬁrms. However, we also show that the relative11
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Sector US UK JP EA Tot
1) Oil & Gas 25 3 5 2 35
2) Basic Materials 20 6 71 8 105
3) Industrials 68 47 127 29 271
4) Consumer Goods 42 17 91 19 169
5) Health Care 17 2 19 1 39
6) Consumer Services 31 25 29 12 97
7) Telecommunications 4 --1 5
8) Utilities 42 -14 5 61
9) Financials 40 64 29 23 156
10) Technology 17 2 12 1 32
Total 306 166 397 101 970
Table 1: Firms distribution across sectors and countries.
importance of domestic and foreign ﬁrms in aﬀecting real developments relates to the business cycle
position of the domestic country.
3 Data and In Sample Evidence
The ﬁrm level information that we consider comes from the equity prices of a large set of ﬁrms sharing
the following characteristics: i) they are based in the United States, the United Kingdom, Japan,
France, Germany or Italy; ii) they have been continuously listed in the respective stock exchanges
since 1973, the ﬁrst year for which Thomson Reuters Datastream provides historical data. This results
in a set of 𝑛 = 970 ﬁrms. They belong to all the industrial sectors of the respective economies, i.e.
we do not rule out any sector, a priori, so to maximise our chances of detecting ﬁrms with high
forecasting power. We consider the so-called level-3 Industry Classiﬁcation Benchmark - the standard
company classiﬁcation system developed by Dow Jones and FTSE -i.e. a 10- sector classiﬁcation.
Table 1 provides a brief description of the sectoral structure in the dataset. There is a large cross
country heterogeneity as for relative sectoral weights, with the industrial and the ﬁnancial sectors
standing out as the most represented. For each ﬁrm we collect the daily stock prices and build the
end-month realized returns and realized volatilities over various horizons (6, 12, 18 and 24 months)
between January 1973 and December 2009. The use of realized volatilities builds on the large literature
initiated by Andersen et al. (2003), and basically uses sums of daily absolute equity returns computed
within each calendar month. It is important to highlight here that the ﬁrms we look at certainly
suﬀer from a survivorship bias. However, considering just the pure forecasting exercise, we could
only improve upon the results we present in this paper by considering additional ﬁrms. On the other
side, we could miss some factors when trying to provide a structural explanation to our forecasting
results. For example, we could miss the fact that predictability increases or decreases when default
risk reaches critical values, a thing which most likely occurs for the ﬁrms which are likely to be about
to leave the aggregate index we look at.12
ECB
Working Paper Series No 1366
August 2011
As said before, the industrial production index (IP) is our measure of real activity in the selected
countries. We also collect daily composite stock market indices, from which we compute end-month
realized returns and realized variances (in the same way as for individual ﬁrms), as well as the term
spread (the diﬀerence between the ten-year government bond yield and the three-month T-bills or
eurodeposit rate). For convenience we aggregate French, German and Italian series into corresponding
𝑝𝑠𝑒𝑢𝑑𝑜 euro-area series via weighted averages, with ﬁxed weights based on 1999 GDPs, thus ending
up with four main economic areas.
To give a preliminary ﬂavour of what kind of results we will get, we present here the unconditional
relationship between real activity, aggregate information and ﬁrm level variables. In practice, we
estimate model (1) throughout the whole sample and look at the ﬁrms’ performance as summarized
by the regressions’ corrected 𝑅2 in Figure 1.6 For each economic area, the horizontal line represents
the corrected 𝑅2 from the regression of the year-on-year growth rate of the Industrial Production
on aggregate information only (lagged IP growth, term spread, aggregate stock market return and
variance). The other (downwards sloping) lines in the ﬁgure depict the (sorted) corrected 𝑅2 after the
inclusion of ﬁrm level returns and variances, one ﬁrm at a time, on top of aggregate information. A
quite remarkable feature is that nearly every ﬁrm can increase the predictability of real developments
relative to aggregate variables. In general, returns seem to be slightly more powerful than variances
and when the two variables are jointly included in the model the 𝑅2 is, on average, some 50% higher
than what provided by aggregate variables only (unreported results conﬁrm the consistency of such
ﬁndings across diﬀerent forecast horizons). These unconditional results somewhat anticipate the
extent in which ﬁrm-level information can improve the predictability of business cycle developments,
although important information as the changing role of the ﬁrms across the cycle as well as a proper
consideration of the data mining issue requires these ﬁndings to be conﬁrmed by an out-of-sample
exercise, which we tackle in the next section.
4 Firm Level Information and Business Cycle Predictability
4.1 Concentration in Predictive Power
We measure the amount of business cycle predictability that is associated to ﬁrm-level information,
for each of the four economic areas that we consider, via out-of-sample predictions of the growth rate
of the Industrial Production index through equation (1). For each month between June 1985 and
December 2009 (the in sample regression goes back to January 1973) we estimate model (1) over
ten-year windows (always using one equation for each forecasting horizon, i.e. a direct forecasting
approach rather than iterated forecasting) and make predictions for the IP growth rate over the
subsequent 6, 12, 18 or 24 months. We run these regressions for all the n=970 ﬁrms but we keep
results for domestic and foreign ﬁrms separated.
Important for understanding our results, when we report the results of these regressions we switch
from the ﬁrm-level standpoint (how the predictive power of a given ﬁrm evolves across time) to what
we call a model-level standpoint, i.e. we aggregate ﬁrm-level results that are relatively close each
other, over time, into a 𝑚𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑙. To do this we need a criterion to rank the 𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑙 performances of the
n=970 ﬁrms in each month. Standing for example in month 𝑡−ℎ we rank the ﬁrms according to their
6We report corrected 𝑅2 coeﬃcients but the diﬀerence in regressors between the speciﬁcation with aggregate infor-
mation only and with aggregate and ﬁrm-speciﬁc information is not particularly large as only one ﬁrm at a time is
considered and the additional variables are only two with three lags each, quite a minor diﬀerence with more than 400
observations.13
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forecasting performance, for the speciﬁc horizon ℎ, recorded over the previous 6 months, as measured
by the RMSE.7 Before ranking the models in this way we need to make sure that this 𝑏𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑤𝑎𝑟𝑑𝑠
𝑙𝑜𝑜𝑘𝑖𝑛𝑔 RMSE (as said computed between 𝑡−ℎ−6a n d𝑡−ℎ when standing in 𝑡) is strongly correlated
with the actual predictive ability of the ﬁrms in 𝑡, for any given forecast horizon ℎ (of course, the
forecasting performance of the ﬁrms in month 𝑡 will be only known only ex-post). We do not report
these results in order to save space but we indeed ﬁnd an almost one-to-one relationship between the
backward looking RMSE and the subsequent actual predictive ability for almost all the ﬁrms. The
presence of short-term persistence in the predictive power for future IP developments at the ﬁrm level
is therefore key in allowing us to identify the ﬁrms which in a given point in time are more likely to
have high predictive power over the subsequent few months. We stress also that the computation of
the 6-month backwards RMSE is obviously irrelevant to the aim of producing the actual forecasts. It
only has the role of providing a criterion to aggregate, in each given month, the many ﬁrm-level based
forecasts of future IP growth rates into 𝑚𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑙𝑠.
Based on this backwards looking measure of RMSE and abstracting for the moment from the
actual forecasting power exhibited by the ﬁrms, Figure 2 (black solid line) shows how many times
each of the domestic ﬁrms shows up in the ﬁrst decile of the predictive distribution for the respective
country’s economic activity. It also compares the actual occurrences to a conﬁdence interval for those
that we would see if ﬁrms were instead randomly selected through uniform odds, both cross sectionally
and across time (i.e. we compare the actual number of times a given ﬁrm shows up in the top decile
with the number that could be expected if all ﬁrms had the same chance to be extracted in any given
month).8 We ﬁnd that two small sets of ﬁrms are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from all the others. The ﬁrst
set includes ﬁrms that show up too few times relative to a random selection, while the second set
comprises ﬁrms that show up too many times relative to this benchmark. We may less formally ﬁnd
the same result browsing through the names of the ﬁrms which ranked in the top ten positions of
the predictive distribution, as ﬁrms’ names tend to remain stable, on average, for a relatively large
number of months. A snapshot for the period between September 2009 and August 2010 is reported
in Table 2. The existence of short-term persistence in the relative predictive power supports the view
that some ﬁrm are diﬀerent from others and that randomness does not represent the main driver of
our results (see Section 6 for additional support). It can be noticed from the Table that once a ﬁrm
begins to exhibit high predictive power for developments in economic activity (i.e. it belongs to the
top 10 ﬁrms in terms of predictability), it continues to do so for around six months, before beginning
to lose importance. Overall, these 𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 ﬁrms are around one tenth of the population of domestic
ﬁrms in each country. Such ﬁndings would support a granular interpretation of aggregate ﬂuctuations,
with aggregate economic activity dynamics being embedded in the grains represented by the small
set of highly predictive ﬁrms that we have identiﬁed.
4.2 Domestic Predictability and Spillovers
Figure 3 shows the actual RMSE split across domestic and foreign ﬁrms. Each RMSE value refers
to a given 𝑚𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑙, as explained in the previous sub-section. For example, model number 𝑤 is the
7The choice of 6 months is of course arbitrary. Ideally we would like to have a measure of instantaneous ﬁt and
this is the main reason to choose 6 months. In this way we can reduce the complexity which we would encounter in
choosing one forecast or a subset of forecasts out of the large number of forecasts that we produce (more than 900 for
each month in each economic area when we look at the full set of domestic and foreign ﬁrms). In each month, the
RMSE computed over a small number of previous months could be employed also to produce a weighted pooling of the
individual forecasts, similarly to the log-score criterion used in, among others, Amisano and Geweke (2009).
8Details available on request.14
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model that considers the IP forecasts originating from those ﬁrms that in each month ranked 𝑤 − 𝑡ℎ
in the distribution of the 𝑏𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑤𝑎𝑟𝑑𝑠 𝑙𝑜𝑜𝑘𝑖𝑛𝑔 RMSE. Each of the models is therefore a collection of
potentially a large number of ﬁrms over the long sample we examine. The regressions run for the
foreign ﬁrms are identical to equation (1) but the ﬁrms we look at are only those that do not belong
to the country under examination. More speciﬁcally, we assess the predictive power for the rates of
change in the IP index in country 𝑖 coming from the equity prices and variances of ﬁrms in country 𝑗.
Figure 3 shows that based on the RMSEs a large number of models induce a remarkable improvement
in the forecasting performance relative to models looking at aggregate information only (the horizontal
straight lines in the Figure). This is true especially of the euro area, although spillovers seem to be
important in all the four economies, including the United States. While adding foreign ﬁrms can
signiﬁcantly improve the prediction of domestic business cycles over and above aggregate information,
the best foreign model (i.e. the collection of the best foreign ﬁrms over time) has approximately the
same predictive power as the best domestic model (i.e. the collection of the best domestic ﬁrms over
time). Figure 4 reports a more formal assessment of the relative performance of the ﬁrms against
aggregate information only and is based on the Diebold and Mariano (1995) test for equal predictive
ability. The test is computed as the t-ratio of the constant in a regression of the diﬀerence between
the absolute values of the error series produced by the competing models on a constant.9
Comparing Figure 2 in sub-section 4.1 to Figures 3 (RMSE) and 4 (Diebold and Mariano test)
seems to suggest that the number of ﬁrms that outperform aggregate information is by and large
overestimated in these latter two Figures.10 While we deal with this data-snooping bias more formally
in Section 6, we also notice here that one thing that may additionally bias the ﬁndings for foreign
ﬁrms is that in constructing the RMSEs for these ﬁrms we do not consider that a part of their
predictive power could derive from information common also to domestic ﬁrms. To control for the
domestic component of the predictive power exhibited by foreign ﬁrms we should run a large number
of regressions (around half a million with 970 ﬁrms) and therefore we explore a simpler but possibly
less eﬀective, alternative. In each month, and for each country, we compute through the backwards
looking RMSE-based ranking of the domestic ﬁrms (introduced in section 4.1) two domestic factors
(one return and one volatility factor), as simple averages of the return and the volatility of the ﬁrst
10 ﬁrms in this ranking. Being built in real time, these factors should maximize predictability and
therefore, as just explained, reduce signiﬁcantly the information content of the foreign ﬁrms, should
it be overlapping with domestic information. The speciﬁcation of these regressions is analogous to eq.
(1), i.e.:
9The Diebold and Mariano (DM) test is not suited for the comparison of nested models, as we have in this paper.
In this case in fact the properties of the statistic collapse, as numerator and denominator are asymptotically the same.
Clark and McCracken (2001) examine empirically the properties of the DM test when dealing with nested models and
conclude that when the out-of-sample estimation is based on rolling windows, as we do, the test if still reliable, although
modestly inferior to the test they propose, in which critical values have to be bootstrapped from the speciﬁc predictive
regression employed. Based on this evidence we chose to continue to use the Diebold and Mariano test and the normal
critical values, as computation times for the bootstrap would be extremely large with the sample size and the cross
sectional dimension that we employ.
10The RMSE of the model including only the lagged change in the IP index is not far from the RMSE obtained
including also aggregate ﬁnancial information. A random walk forecast does instead much worse, as we consider rather
long forecasting horizons. We do not report results for the random walk in the text but for example for the United
States it is only at the 12month horizon that the random walk has approximately the same RMSE of the model that
uses only lagged changes in the IP. At the same time its RMSE remains much higher than the for the model that
employs the slope of the yield curve and the variance of the stock market. Its performance at all three remaining
forecast horizons is much worse than the other models that use only aggregate information and therefore also of the
best models that consider ﬁrm-speciﬁc variables.16
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where 𝐷𝑅𝑒𝑡 and 𝐷𝑉𝑎𝑟 are the domestic return and variance factors built as just described and
the other variables are the same as deﬁned in equation (1). We overall ﬁnd (results are just described
to save space) that the RMSEs produced by foreign ﬁrms and reported in Figure 3 do not change
much when domestic factors are also considered, therefore supporting the view that foreign ﬁrms can
provide signiﬁcant information beyond domestic aggregate information. At the same time, however,
as already mentioned, Figures 3 and 4 also evidence that foreign ﬁrms hardly provide information
in addition to the best domestic ﬁrms (i.e. the blue line -foreign ﬁrms -is never below the black
line -domestic ﬁrms -for the ﬁrms providing the lowest RMSEs, those in the left hand side of the
Figure). This consideration however applies to the average month in the sample. In fact, as we show
in the next subsection, the monthly ranking of the ﬁrms evidences signiﬁcant changes over time in
the relative importance of domestic and foreign ﬁrms.
4.3 Country patterns
Figure 5 shows the country breakdown for the ﬁrms that rank in the ﬁrst decile of the predictive
distribution for each of the four economic areas. These breakdowns are generated through model (2),
i.e. controlling foreign ﬁrms for the information already embodied in domestic factors11. Unlike what
sample averages suggest, the relative weights of the foreign countries -for each given domestic country
-recorded signiﬁcant variations through time. The swings in the foreign weights have at times been
common (so that a global factor seems to have been inﬂuencing real developments in all the areas
analyzed) while in other periods some speciﬁc country has tended to gain relatively more weight. To
mention a few interesting cases it is worthwhile looking at Japan, where domestic ﬁrms were key
to explain the recession recorded around the end of the 90s, but almost irrelevant to anticipate the
recent episode, with euro area and UK ﬁrms having instead a much more relevant role. The 2001
US recessions could have been anticipated almost equally likely by looking at US, UK or euro area
ﬁrms; however, standing in December 2006, the US recession that would have started twelve months
later could have been anticipated more by UK ﬁrms than by US ﬁrms. Identifying the reasons behind
the observed changes in the relative weights of the countries goes beyond the aim of this paper (but
11As explained in the previous sub-section, these factors are the average return and its variance computed for the
ten domestic ﬁrms that in a given month have exhibited the highest predictive ability17
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see section 5.2 for some attempts on this respect with reference for the domestic ﬁrms in the United
States only).
With the aim of analyzing the diﬀerent information about future economic developments that are
conveyed by diﬀerent ﬁrms, Figures 6 and 7 present range forecasts for the US and euro area 12-month
growth rate in the IP index that come from diﬀerent types of ﬁrms, i.e. those in the top 20 percent
and bottom 20 percent of the predictive distribution (i.e. from top and bottom quintiles). Forecast
ranges for IP are built -for each quintile -by taking the forecasts provided by the top and bottom 10
percent of ﬁrms, respectively, within the quintile. We present the forecasts ranges split by domestic
and foreign ﬁrms, each of them being also computed as just described. Results are presented for the
12-month horizon only, but they are broadly similar for the remaining three forecast horizons and
are not reported to save space. Two things are worth evidencing. First, there exist large diﬀerences
in the ﬁt provided by ﬁrms in the ﬁrst and ﬁfth quintiles, for both the United States and the euro
area. While we are not surprised by the diﬀerent performances of the two sets of ﬁrms, as they have
been selected precisely according to a forecasting accuracy criterion, still it seems remarkable that
such diﬀerent forecasting performances can be achieved through ﬁrms belonging to the same stock
market index. Second, looking at the top quintile (top panel in both Figures) the conﬁdence intervals
for the IP forecast (at the 12-month horizon) are nearly always including the actual rate of growth
in the IP index and are rather tight around it, although with some time variation reﬂecting changes
in the volatility of the IP growth rates. Overall there are no big diﬀerences across the conﬁdence
intervals provided by domestic and foreign ﬁrms in the top quintile of the predictive distribution,
while predictive power is slightly higher for foreign ﬁrms in the bottom quintile, although this is
largely irrelevant to the aim of selecting good forecasts. Visual inspection of the forecast ranges
associated to ﬁrms in the bottom quintile evidences instead large errors throughout the majority of
the sample as well as a bigger width of the conﬁdence intervals relative to those produced by the ﬁrms
in the top quintile.
One last thing to be pointed out is that focusing on the comparison of the IP forecasts across
domestic and foreign ﬁrms or between ﬁrms in the top and the bottom quintile hides the gain in
predictive power that the ﬁrm-level information provides relative to aggregate information. Figure 8
shows the actual values of the 12-month rate of change in the US IP index over the out-of-sample
period (red line), along with its forecast based on aggregate information (black line) and the range
forecast (as said above the 10-th and 90-th percentile inside the top quintile) coming from the top
quintile of the ﬁrms (blue lines). Focusing for example on the 1990/1991 recession, one can see that
aggregate information was broadly irrelevant to anticipate the coming slowdown in activity. At the
same time, a signiﬁcant number of models (i.e. those in the top decile of (the top quintile) of ﬁrms)
could anticipate it rather well. Similar episodes can be detected also in phases of positive economic
growth as well as in the other US two recession episodes included in the out-of-sample period.
5 Characteris ticsof the Firmsand Predictability
5.1 Sectoral Patterns
Having established that the returns and the variances of domestic and foreign equity prices boost
the predictability of aggregate ﬂuctuations at various horizons, we look more in detail at how the
predictive power is split across sectors within a given country. As the message conveyed by the joint
observation of Figures 2-4 is that only a relatively small number of ﬁrms (domestic and foreign) can
sizeably improve business cycle forecasting, asking ourselves whether these ﬁrms are special due to18
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the particular sector in which they operate is quite a straightforward question. The bottom line here
is that the conditional standpoint is again key to unveil the existence of sectoral patterns.
Figure 9 reports the weight of each of the ten sectors in the ﬁrst and the last deciles of the
predictive distribution for future IP changes averaged over time, along with the corresponding actual
weight of the sector in the sample. From this unconditional perspective no sector shows up in the
top and bottom deciles with a diﬀerent proportion than it has in the sample. In other words, each
of the ten sectors can successfully forecast business cycle ﬂuctuations proportionally to its weight in
the sample. As anticipated, instead, once a conditional standpoint is taken, the sector to which ﬁrms
belong emerges as an important feature of their forecasting performance, with sectors having ﬁrms
with returns and variances that tend to anticipate recessions but not expansions while other sectors
have ﬁrms that display more power in anticipating expansions.
Figure 10 provides a description of the sectoral patterns evidenced within the (12-month ahead)
predictive distribution of the ﬁrms, focusing for brevity on the largest sectors in the sample only.
Financial ﬁrms seem to have some success in predicting recessions especially in the United States and
in Japan and remarkably so for the last episode. The same sectoral pattern, however, is not evidenced
around the burst of the dot-com bubble around late 1999, when especially ﬁrms within the Consumer
Goods and Consumer Services sector were more predominant in anticipating real developments. As
for other sectors a broad ﬁnding is that industrial ﬁrms seem to be good predictors of economic
expansions while Consumer Goods are not strongly associated to the observed movements in the IP
indices. 12
5.2 Balance Sheet Items
The industrial sector, a proxy for the core business of the ﬁrms, is only one of the many variables
which capture their characteristics, other choices being for instance the value of their assets, sales,
revenues or debt, their size as measured for example by the number of employees and so on. To shed
light on the importance of other key characteristics of the ﬁrms on their ability to anticipate business
cycle developments we collect, from Worldscope, yearly data for a number of key balance sheet items
over the longest available sample for each of the ﬁrms included in the regressions presented so far.
These data have been retrieved for US ﬁrms only as the corresponding information is richer, between
1985 and 2009. We aim to identify a relationship between balance sheet items and economic activity
by regressing the h-month rate of change in the US Industrial Production index (where, as before,
h=6,12,18 and 24 months) on the same set of aggregate variables as in eq. (1) and on a single balance
sheet item in turn, i.e.:
12As forecasts are made 12months before the start of a recession, the returns and the volatilities recorded within
some sectors relative to others seem to be able to capture signs of forthcoming changes in business cycle conditions.19
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with i=1,...,34 balance sheet indicators. In this regression the terms BS measure the diﬀerence
between the average value of the 𝑖 − 𝑡ℎ balance sheet item recorded by, respectively, the ten top
and the ten bottom ﬁrms in the predictive distribution for future IP growth, as of the end of the
previous calendar year (i.e when considering the IP growth recorded in March 2007, the diﬀerence in
a given balance sheet item refers to 31 December 2005, if the 6-month horizon is examined). Although
balance sheet items are available only yearly, the ranking of the ﬁrms as a function of their predictive
power changes potentially in each month (see Table 2 for a snapshot referred to the United States)
and therefore the balance sheet indicator records nonetheless a noticeable monthly variation.13 Notice
that the balance sheet items in these regressions are dated 𝑡 − ℎ and as such they are lagged by as
much as the forecast horizon, consistently also with the fact that it is based on the ranking of the
ﬁrms made in 𝑡 − ℎ − 1, when forecasting at the h-month ahead horizon. However, one could also
suppose that some given ﬁrms are more able than others to capture future developments in business
cycle conditions because of their balance sheet characteristics at time 𝑡, rather than at 𝑡 − ℎ.O n
this respect we also ran regressions (3) placing the balance sheet information at time 𝑡, i.e. as 𝐵𝑆𝑡.
Despite some changes in the size of the coeﬃcients there did not seem to be particular variations in
the signiﬁcance pattern in Table 3 below.
Basically regression (3) allows us to verify whether gaps in balance sheet items across US ﬁrms,
given the ranking of these ﬁrms in the predictive distribution for future US IP changes, can account
for the diﬀerence in their predictive power. Results are reported in Table 3, where we grouped
the signiﬁcant balance sheet items into a few categories (Performance, Liquidity, Size, Investments,
Foreign Activity, Inventories). The items displayed in the Table are only those (out of 34 selected
items) for which either 𝗾1 or 𝗾2 (see equation (3)) were signiﬁcant. It seems to be especially cross
sectional divergences in items capturing Performance and Investments to be connected to subsequent
real developments. Diﬀerences in Inventories and in the International Activity of the ﬁrms seems to
be also able to anticipate business cycle developments. Measures of ﬁrm liquidity and indebtedness
are also signiﬁcant as well as some measures of size, i.e. employees and capitalization.
13Balance sheet data are at times missing for some ﬁrms or availability starts later than the beginning of our sample.
Therefore there may not be a complete match between the IP predictions and the features of the top ﬁrms that have
generated it.20
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6-month 12-month 18-month 24-month
Performance Book value per share -0.44 -4.46 -11.73 -10.57
Cash per share -0.77 -8.91 -26.54 -17.86
Sales per share -0.61 -3.71 -3.95 -2.16
Cost of goods to sales -2.51 1.55 8.11 16.16
Assets per employee 0.13 0.11 0.04 0.01
Liquidity Current ratio -75.11 -215.51 -277.83 -253.66
Quick ratio -162.02 -295.33 -292.86 -287.85
Size Employees -0.025 -0.022 -0.0002 0.0015
Capitalization 5.3*10−6 1.15*10−5 1.05*10−5 8.65*10−6
Investments Cap expenditures/sales -19.88 -35.77 -14.66 7.94
Capl Expenditures / Total Assets -29.31 -37.28 -13.05 33.42
Reinvstment Rate -- -20.11
R&D -0.71 -75.24 -117.19 -111.49
Assets Turnover -38.13 160.04 410.39 729.43
Other Invstments 3.68*10−5 4.64*10−5 2.19*10−5 4.14*10−5
Foreign Acitivty Foreign/Total Assets 5.71 7.81 -0.85 11.78
Foreign/Total Income -0.49 0.49 0.97 0.89
Foreign/Total Sales 6.65 2.27 -9.03 -0.85
Inventories Inventory Turnover 2.41 -1.41 16.72 8.24
Inventory, days in 2.26 1.03 -2.64 -3.38
Inventory/Total Assets 10.49 25.08 26.15 27.64
Inventories 3.68*10−5 -1.66*10−4 -2.0*10−4 -2.44*10−4
Table 3: The Table reports the diﬀerence 𝗾𝑖
1 - 𝗾𝑖
2 as deﬁned in equation (3), i.e the coeﬃcients that come from
a regression of the rate of growth of the US Industrial Production index, over ℎ months, where ℎ =6 ,12,18
and 24, on lagged values of the change in the IP index, lagged slope of the US term structure, lagged US
aggregate stock market return and variance and the lagged gap in a given balance sheet item computed for
the top 15 ﬁrms and bottom 15 ﬁrms. The diﬀerences in the 𝗾 parameters have been reported only when
at least one of the two coeﬃcients was statistically diﬀerent from zero. Regressions have been run for the
period January 1985 - December 2009.21
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6 Robustness of results
In this section we try to i) to better understand the origin of the higher predictive power found for some
ﬁrms and ii) to make sure that the advantages in looking at ﬁrm level information beyond aggregate
series are indeed statistically signiﬁcant and not driven by randomness. As for the ﬁrst issue, having
included both the aggregate stock market return and variance in regression (1) we capture ﬁrm-level
information that reﬂects only the idiosyncratic movement of their equity prices. However, one could
wonder about how ﬁrms that help predict future business cycle developments behave, relative to the
market, when compared to ﬁrms that do not help in forecasting aggregate real developments. To
shed light on this, for each given month in the out of sample period, i.e. 1985 -2009, and with
reference only to the top and bottom 30 ﬁrms in the predictive distribution for future IP changes, we
perform the following exercise. We cast the equity return of each ﬁrm in turn and the aggregate stock
market return into a bivariate garch(1,1) model, which is estimated via DCC (Cappiello et al., 2006)14
over ﬁxed-length windows of 60 months. In this bivariate model, the mean equations are speciﬁed
so that each of the endogenous variables (the ﬁrm’s return and the market return) include the ﬁrst
own lag as well as the ﬁrst lag of the other variable. Once the DCC is estimated we store the ﬁrm’s
idiosyncratic variance, its correlation with the market return and its beta coeﬃcient always relative
to the market.15 For each rolling sample, these three measures are stored in relation to the three lags
employed in regression (1), i.e. the lags speciﬁed by the f(h) functions. The three measures are then
aggregated over, respectively, the top and bottom 30 ﬁrms (identiﬁed in the previous sections through
the 𝑏𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑤𝑎𝑟𝑑𝑠 𝑙𝑜𝑜𝑘𝑖𝑛𝑔 RMSE) so to have their averages across ﬁrms with high or low predictive power
for future industrial production. Looking at the 12-month forecasting horizon (the remaining three
horizons broadly provide the same picture), the diﬀerences in the three measures across the two
groups of ﬁrms are signiﬁcantly related to GDP developments and we evidence this via the following
regression, where only the ﬁrst lag for each of the three measures (12 months, as we are focusing on




= 𝗼0 +Σ 𝑖=1,3𝗼𝑗𝑋𝑗,𝑡−12 + 𝜀𝑡 (4)
where the vector X collects the three variables computed above (variances, correlations, betas)



































∗𝐷𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑡−12 +0 .023𝐷𝑖𝑓𝑓𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑡−12 − 0.022𝐷𝑖𝑓𝑓𝐵𝑒𝑡𝑡−12
In these regressions DiﬀVar is the diﬀerence in average idiosyncratic variances among the top
30 and the bottom 30 ﬁrms and DiﬀCor and DiﬀBet are the corresponding diﬀerences among the
14DCC stands for Dynamic Conditional Correlation and is a convenient and quick way to estimate a multivariate
conditionally heteroskedastic model.
15The beta is typically used in ﬁnance to measure the sensitivity of an asset relative to the market.22
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correlations and the beta coe±cients of the ¯rms' idiosyncratic return with respect to the market
return. The equations show that indeed aggregate business cycle developments between time t ¡ 12
and time t are related to di®erences in the conditional variances of the top 30 and bottom 30 ¯rms
as measured at t ¡ 12, with a negative relationship prevailing in the four economic areas (i.e an
highest variance of the top 30 ¯rms relative to the bottom 30 ¯rms tends to anticipate recessions).
Di®erences in correlations are signi¯cant in the United States and in the euro area only, and di®erences
in betas are much less signi¯cant. In a nutshell, these regressions suggest that it is not the existence
of di®erences in the relationships with the market return, the betas or the correlations, to drive ¯rms'
predictive power. Rather, the latter seem to depend on the cross sectional gap among the ¯rm-level
idiosyncratic stock return volatilities.
As for the second point, the so-called data-snooping problem may seriously undermine the signif-
icance of the results presented in the previous sections. This issue was ¯rst raised by White (2000)
and further addressed by Hansen (2005) via a test for superior predictive ability (SPA).15 Hansen's
(2005) improvement to the White (2000) reality check test has to do with the fact that the latter
was shown to be negatively a®ected when a large number of models representing poor and irrelevant
alternatives were added to the comparisons. In fact, adding useless models, ®
m, which is used as a
signi¯cance threshold, where ® is the chosen signi¯cance level, can be arbitrarily pushed towards zero.
The test for superior predictive ability is based on the relative performance of two models, de¯ned
as
dk;t = L(»t;±0;t¡h) ¡ L(»t;±k;t¡h) (5)
where k = 1;:::;m, so that dk;t measures the performance of model k relative to the benchmark
at time t. When the pairwise comparisons between the m models and the benchmark are collected
into the vector d, the null hypothesis can be cast as H0 : d · 0. As the derivation of the test
assumes asymptotic normality for d, then a quadratic form of the test could be employed but this
is di±cult to implement for large m. Therefore, only the diagonal elements of the covariance matrix
­ are considered and, due to this nuisance, a bootstrapped derivation of the test statistics must be
adopted. In a nutshell the test statistics proposed is
T
SPA













for k = 1;2;:::m.
For our case (results are just discussed to save space) the p-values of the SPA test are ranging
between p=0.01 and p=0.15 (depending on which of the three versions of the tests proposed in
Hansen, 2005, is used). In any case, the test suggests that it is very likely that some ¯rms indeed
15In principle, the Diebold and Mariano test (1995) (see Figure 4) should be able to tell whether a model provides or
not the same predictive ability of another model for a given variable of interest. However, the DM test is derived under
the null of equal predictive ability (EPA) while testing for superior predictive ability (SPA) is more complex. In fact
EPA involves a simple null hypothesis while SPA leads to composite hypotheses and is known to involve asymptotic
distributions which are a®ected by nuisance parameters (and a a result the null hypothesis is not unique).23
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have additional predictive power for future IP changes relative to aggregate information as well as to
other ¯rms and predictability does not seem to be driven by the randomness in the data.
7 Implications for Macroeconomic and Financial Stability
Beyond improving our ability to anticipate business cycle developments, could the same ¯rm level
information used so far be useful also to ¯nancial stability aims? In other words, can we derive macro-
¯nancial stability considerations from the cross sectional dispersion of the monthly IP forecasts for a
given horizon h?
As explained in the previous sections, in each month and for each of the four economic areas,
we generate almost 1000 IP forecasts, for each of the four horizons considered (h=6, 12, 18 and
24 months), based on aggregate ¯nancial information and ¯rm level equity returns and volatilities.
Once eliminated some outliers in the predicted IP growth rates, typically associated to exceptional
declines or gains recorded by a few equity prices (for example trimming the data above and below
pre-assigned thresholds, with plus and minus 70 percent monthly equity price changes having been
used in the paper), we can for example i) compute the probability density function of the IP forecasts
at horizon h via a kernel estimator, ii) construct range forecasts associated to selected percentiles of
this distribution and last iii) compute a monthly Value at Risk (V aRp), with p being a pre-speci¯ed
p-value, for the IP growth rate. 16 Last, the returns and the variances of the ¯rms that form a given
model could be used17 to filter the time series of a number of unobserved leading indicators18 for the
business cycle at the selected horizon.
What is worth noticing in the construction of this economic VaR is that it does not come, as
traditional VaR measures, from a simulation carried out via an single equation or a multivariate
model describing the dynamic behavior of the IP index (see Manganelli and Engle, 2001, for the typical
approaches to measuring Value at Risk, and De Nicolo' and Lucchetta, 2010, for a related model).
Rather it exploits the cross sectional information of the equity returns, so that the uncertainty about
future IP rates of change does not relate to the density of the past forecast errors in predicting such IP
changes but rather from the current con¯guration of the cross sectional equity returns and variances.
In principle a mixed approach could also be employed whereby, as V aR is typically computed, future
paths of the IP rate of change would be bootstrapped out of each ¯rm-level regression and then these
predictive densities would be averaged, either using equal weights or by means of the RMSE criterion
that we have been using so far. Whether one strategy dominates over the other is an empirical issue
that we do not tackle, to save space, in this paper.19
For illustrative purposes, Figure 11 reports the 5 percent Value at Risk (the negative rate of
change in the IP index that can be observed with a 5 percent probability over the next 12 months)
for the IP growth at the 12-month horizon for the four areas, while Figure 12 reports, for the United
States only, the 12-month changes in the IP index as well as the 1- and 5-percent VaR. Also, Figure
13 reports, for the US only, four predictive density functions for IP growth over the subsequent 12
16As each individual IP forecast is associated to a RMSE criterion, the forecast ranges associated to each, say, quintile
can be assigned a probability value. These can be used to assess the distance in the expected ¯t of the models.
17See Table 2 to recall how ¯rms are related to models.
18Potentially there are as many as the number of ¯rms in the cross section.
19Although some of the ¯rms we identify provide the highest local predictability to subsequent developments in the
IP indices, we cannot conclude that they are also systemically important ¯rms, able to spread a given shock to the
remaining ¯rms in the economy (see for example the VAR for VaR described in White et al., 2011). Basically, we use
individual equity prices just as ¯ltering devices for a set of unobservable shocks, with no implications for the causal
relationships among the set of ¯rms.24
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months referred to dates spanning the last three recession episodes. For the 1990-1991 and the 2001
recessions the density correctly had a negative median as well as negative skewness for the central
months of the recession episodes. For the last recession, the economic slowdown is instead captured
with some delay (see also Figure 6), as the median of the density becomes negative only in December
2008, i.e. one year after the o±cial start of the recession, as computed by the NBER. It has to be
said, on this respect, that sharply negative GDP growth ¯gures were recorded exactly in 2008Q4 and
in 2009Q1 so that at least from the nowcasting standpoint the VaR predicted by the model would
have nonetheless been useful.
8 Conclusions
This paper has shown, with reference to four economic areas and using a sample that for the out of
sample exercise starts in 1985, that the idiosyncratic returns and variances of individual equity prices
contain the seeds of future real developments. Importantly, the forecasting ability of a given ¯rm is
found to be persistent, averaging around six months, which leads to exclude that randomness is a
driver of the forecasting power, as also con¯rmed by ad-hoc tests. Domestic ¯rms as well foreign ¯rms
are successful in predicting domestic real developments but the relative weight of the two sets of ¯rms
depends signi¯cantly on the cyclical position of the domestic country. We do not ¯nd size, as Gabaix
(2010) proposes, to be the key factor behind predictability. We unveil that some sectoral patterns are
related to predictability as well as that some balance sheet items are related to the observed predictive
power of the ¯rms. However, we feel that additional e®orts must be undertaken to shed more light
on this challenging and promising issues.25
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Aggregate Variables and Individual Returns
Aggregate Variables and Individual Variances
Aggregate Variables, Individual Returns and Variances
Figure 1: Ranked 𝑅2 from the regression of the Industrial Production year on year growth rate on diﬀerent
combinations of lagged aggregate and individual variables, see equation (1). The forecasting horizon is 12
months. Data are monthly from January 1973 to December 2009. Aggregate variables include the lagged
rate of change in the IP index, the term spread and the time varying volatility of the composite stock market
index. The x-axis reports the number of ﬁrms in a given country.








































































































































Figure 2: Actual ranked occurrences of each ﬁrm in the four economic areas in the ﬁrst decile of the respective
predictive distribution for subsequent changes in the IP index (black line) compared to a case in which all
the ﬁrms have the same chances of having predictive (solid blue line, dotted lines are 95 percent conﬁdence
intervals).28
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Figure 3: RMSEs of models conditioned upon domestic (blue) and non-domestic (black) ﬁrm level information.
Horizontal lines refer to RMSE of models with only aggregate variables (lagged IP (red), lagged IP and term
spread (green)). The forecast horizon is 12-month and the out of sample analysis refers to the period June
1985 - December 2009 and is based on rolling windows of equal length (10 years).29
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Figure 4: Diebold and Mariano tests of predictive ability of models including i) domestic (black) and ii)
non-domestic (blue) ﬁrm level information, relative to aggregate domestic information only. The horizontal
(red) line is the 5 percent signiﬁcance threshold for the null of equal predictive ability. The out of sample
forecasts are referred to the 12-month maturity and estimation is based on ﬁxed-length windows of 10 years
between June 1985 and December 2009.30
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United States United Kingdom Euro Area Japan Industrial Production
Figure 5: Composition by country of the ﬁrms in the ﬁrst decile of the predictive distribution for 12-month
ahead rates of change in the Industrial Production index. Data are monthly from July 1995 to December
2009.31
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Figure 6: Range of the predictions for the 12-month ahead rate of change in the US IP index, using domestic
ﬁrms (red) and foreign ﬁrms (grey) in the top and bottom 20 percent of the predictive distribution. Monthly
data between June 1985 and December 2009.32
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Prediction of euro area IP changes, 12-month horizon
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Figure 7: Range of the predictions for the 12-month ahead rate of change in the euro area IP index, using
domestic ﬁrms (red) and foreign ﬁrms (grey) in the top and bottom 20 percent of the predictive distribution.
Monthly data between June 1985 and December 2009.33
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Figure 8: Actual values of the 12-month rate of change in the US IP index and alternative forecasts, Out of
sample analysis between June 1985 to December 2009.
















































Figure 9: Average sectoral composition of the ﬁrms in the ﬁrst and last deciles of the predictive distribution
of 12-month ahead rates of change in the IP indices and corresponding frequencies of the same sectors in the
full sample. Averages refer to the out-of-sample period June 1985 - December 2009.34
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Figure 10: Relative frequency of selected sectors in the ﬁrst decile of the 12-month ahead predictive distribu-
tion for the Industrial Production indices. Based on out of sample analysis between June 1985 and December
2009.35
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Figure 11: Five percent Value at Risk (VaR) for the year-on-year IP growth rates. Monthly data between
June 1985 and December 2009.
IP VaR 5% VaR 1%








Figure 12: Actual year-on-year growth rate in the US IP index and corresponding 1- and 5-percent Value at
Risk (VaR). Monthly data between June 1985 and December 2009. In both panels, the VaR reported for a
given month is ’predicted’ 12months before that month. Shaded areas are US NBER-based recessions.36
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Figure 13: Distribution of the expected year-on-year growth of the US IP index at selected dates around the
last three recession episodes.WORKING PAPER SERIES
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